

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

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P R 231023Z JUN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1060

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0296

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND THE FRG  
COLLECTIVE APPROACH

REF: USNATO 3366

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT DESIRABLE  
TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT  
IN THE SPC ON JUNE 26 AS SCHEDULED. THIS MESSAGE DIS-  
CUSSES THE FRG POSITION THAT MBFR COMMITMENTS BY NON-US  
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE AND THE  
RELATIONSHIP OF THIS POSITION TO THE PARTICULAR ISSUE OF  
REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. IT SUGGESTS THAT THIS FRG APPROACH  
SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH FRG OFFICIALS TO POINT OUT TO  
THEM (A) THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FRG POSITION AND (B) THAT THERE

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ARE OTHER WAYS OF ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING

THAT FRG POSITION. END SUMMARY.

2. WE BELIEVE THE SPC SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST AN INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION OF NEW GUIDANCE FOR THE AHG ON PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS ON JUNE 26. A CLEARER ALLIANCE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AND ON THE ISSUE OF THE TIME BETWEEN THE PHASES WILL NOT OF ITSELF BRING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT. BUT SPC DISCUSSION OF BOTH ISSUES WILL HELP THE SPC TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR SUCH CLARIFICATION AND TO GAIN AN APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT LEAVING THESE TWO ISSUES IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION WILL ADD TO THE BURDEN ON OPTION III.

3. THE MAIN WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN INTRODUCING OPTION III IS TO BRING THE EAST INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE WEST'S ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION PROGRAM. TO GAIN THIS OBJECTIVE WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH. THE LEVERAGE GENERATED BY OPTION III, WHILE PRESUMABLY CONSIDERABLE, CLEARLY HAS ITS LIMITS. IN OUR VIEW, OPTION III IS NOT OF SUFFICIENT DIMENSIONS TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT BOTH TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AND TO PHASING. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF A WEAK WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING WILL ONLY OVERBURDEN OPTION III.

4. IN A DISCUSSION HERE WITH ROTH AND RUTH OF THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE JUNE 17, RUTH RESISTED THE IDEA OF PRESENTING CLARIFICATIONS TO THE EAST ON THESE TWO PHASING ISSUES PRIOR TO PRESENTING OPTION III TO THE EAST. BUT HE WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING SO AT THE SAME TIME OPTION III WAS PRESENTED. PARALLEL PRESENTATION WOULD MEET OUR OBJECTIVE OF NOT OVERLOADING OPTION III. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH WE AGREE THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON OPTION III, WE THINK THAT THE SPC SHOULD WORK ON THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT ISSUE ALONG WITH OPTION III, SO THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO PRESENT BOTH OPTION III AND AN IMPROVED PHASING POSITION IN THE SAME TIME FRAME.

5. IF THE EAST BEGINS TO MOVE ON THE ISSUE OF ASYMMETRICAL  
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REDUCTIONS AS THE RESULT OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPTION III, IT IS LIKELY AT THE SAME TIME TO INCREASE ITS PRESSURE FOR A SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENT OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. THE EAST WILL ARGUE THAT, IF IT IS EXPECTED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE ASYMMETRY OF REDUCTIONS, IT SHOULD RECEIVE COMPENSATION THROUGH ALLIED CONCESSIONS ON PHASING. THIS ISSUE MAY COME UP MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE

NOW ANTICIPATE AFTER OPTION III IS TABLED WITH THE EAST. TO RESIST THESE PRESSURES, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIES TO HAVE AVAILABLE A TIGHTLY REASONED AND COHERENT POSITION ON PHASING. THIS IS NOT NOW THE CASE.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE COMMENTS MADE BY ROTH AND RUTH THAT, TO OBTAIN FRG AGREEMENT TO A MORE COHERENT WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE FRG VIEWS THAT WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE SHOULD ONLY BE COLLECTIVE, NOT INDIVIDUAL.

7. IN INSISTING THAT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AS WELL AS OTHER COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BE COLLECTIVE, FRG OFFICIALS ARE PURSUING TWO VALUES: (A) THE DESIRE TO PROTECT THE COLLECTIVE CEILING; AND (B) THE DESIRE TO AVOID BILATERAL COMMITMENTS VISA-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

8. WE SUPPORT THE FIRST FRG OBJECTIVE, THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR WESTERN FORCES. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THIS CONCEPT. BUT, SINCE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THEMSELVES BEGUN INFORMALLY TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES, THE BEST COURSE FOR THE ALLIES IS TO CONTINUE A HARD POSITION AND TO PERMIT THE EASTERN POSITION TO DEVELOP STILL FURTHER.

9. HOWEVER, WE HOPE IT CAN BE MADE CLEAR TO FRG OFFICIALS THAT, IF AN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COLLECTIVE CEILING IS OBTAINED, THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR THE FRG OR OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AVOID INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. ALL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, WHETHER INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE, WOULD BE SUPERSEDED AS SOON AS THEY

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ARE IMPLEMENTED BY THE COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING, AND THE LATTER WILL BE THE SOLE CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO WHICH WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CAN BE HELD.

10. THE SECOND FRG MOTIVE, THE DESIRE TO AVOID BILATERAL COMMITMENTS VISA-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION IS A PRODUCT OF UNDERLYING FRG NERVOUSNESS AND INSECURITY ABOUT THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND THE FRG. FRG OFFICIALS LIKE VAN WELL WHO ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS DO SO BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT AT SOME FUTURE POINT THE FRG MAY BE LEFT ON ITS OWN WITHOUT STRONG US SUPPORT TO CARRY OUT SOME POSSIBLE DISPUTE WITH THE POWERFUL USSR ABOUT WHETHER THE FRG HAS OBSERVED THE TERMS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0296

FROM US REP MBFR

11. THIS UNDERLYING FRG CONCERN IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT HAS BEEN ARTICULATED IN AN IMPRACTICAL WAY.

12. FIRST, UNLESS THERE IS SOME UNEXPECTED MAJOR CHANGE IN THE SOVIET OUTLOOK, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS ON ANY ASPECT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO RUN COUNTER TO DEEP-ROOTED SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. THIS POSITION INVOLVES SOVIET INTERESTS FAR BROADER THAN THE MBFR AGREEMENT WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO ABANDON. IF THE FRG MAINTAINS THIS POSITION AS A PRECONDITIN TO AN MBFR AGREEMENT, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT AND PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT.

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13. MOREOVER, THE IDEA THAT A COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENT WOULD PROTECT A FRIENDLESS FRG AGAINST SOVIET PRESSURES IS UNREALISTIC AND LEGALISTIC. THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIETS EFFECTIVELY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE FRG IN THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD OR IN ANY OTHER FIELD IS A FACTOR, NOT OF THE PRECISE FORMULATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND FRG, BUT OF THE GENERAL STATE AND HEALTH OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. IF THE FUTURE IS INDEED AS BLEAK AS SOME FRG OFFICIALS SEEM TO THINK IT COULD BE, A PARAGRAPH WILL NOT PROTECT THE FRG FROM SOVIET PRESSURE ON MBFR ISSUES.

14. WE THINK THE US SHOULD MAKE STRONG EFFORTS TO BRING FRG OFFICIALS AWAY FROM THIS IMPRACTICAL AND UNREALISTIC APPROACH. ROTH'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY. IN THEIR RECENT CONVERSATION HERE, ROTH AND RUTH ADMITTED THAT THE FRG VIEW ON COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUS RESISTANCE FROM THE SOVIETS AND MIGHT NOT BE FEASIBLE. BUT THEY COMPLAINED AT THE SAME TIME THAT NO ALLY TOOK FRG CONCERNS SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THEM, AS EVIDENCED IN THE RESERVED TREATMENT WHICH THEIR PAPER ON THE FORM OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT HAS THUS FAR RECEIVED FROM THE ALLIES.

15. FOR SIMILAR REASONS, THE FRG HAS BEEN EXPRESSING NERVOUSNESS ABOUT A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM FOR MBFR. THIS ISSUE WILL PROBABLY COME UP AGAIN DURING NATO CONSULTATIONS ON OPTION III, PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH INTRODUCTION OF FOLLOW-ON NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS.

16. THE FRG APPEARS TO FEEL THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SOME FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH YET ANOTHER POSSIBILITY FOR BILATERAL INTERFERENCE IN FRG SECURITY AFFAIRS. HERE AGAIN, WE THINK FRG NERVOUSNESS DOES NOT LEAD TO A LOGICAL CONCLUSION. WE STRONGLY FAVOR A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM FOR THESE REASONS:

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A. THERE WILL BE A PRACTICAL NEED AFTER AN MBFR AGREEMENT FOR A CONTINUING EAST-WEST EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION OF POSSIBLE COMPLAINTS. DISCUSSION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS HAS MADE THIS EVIDENT AND IT IS IN THE WESTERN AS WELL AS THE EASTERN INTEREST.

B. EXPERIENCE WITH THE BERLIN AGREEMENT AND OTHER EAST-WEST AGREEMENTS INDICATES TO US THAT THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS THE PERIOD OF INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION, WHEN IT IS ESSENTIAL TO INSIST ON METICULOUS OBSERVATION BY THE SOVIETS.

C. US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WOULD BE A FURTHER "CHARTER," ONE RECOGNIZED BY THE SOVIETS, FOR CONTINUED US INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES.

D. A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM, WHERE THE US AND FRG WOULD CONTINUE SIDE BY SIDE TO BE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH ONE ANOTHER IN ISSUES CONNECTED WITH IMPLEMENTING AN MBFR AGREEMENT IS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID SOVIET EFFORTS TO ISOLATE THE FRG AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON IT IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR AND OTHER SECURITY ISSUES. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A MECHANISM, WHERE THE ALLIES WOULD CONTINUE TO COORDINATE THEIR POSITIONS AMONG EACH OTHER, WOULD MAKE IT UNNECESSARY TO SEEK TO LIMIT ALL FRG COMMITMENTS TO COLLECTIVE ONES.

17. IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING FRG OFFICIALS AWAY FROM THEIR COLLECTIVE APPROACH AND ALSO THEIR OPPOSITION TO A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM IF US OFFICIALS COULD MAKE CLEAR TO THEM IN A BASIC DISCUSSION OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES THAT:

A. THE COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IS UNNECESSARY. EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COLLECTIVE CEILING WILL ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO VARY THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES WITHIN THAT CEILING.

B. A COLLECTIVE FORM OF COMMITMENT PROVIDES LESS EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESSURES AGAINST THE FRG THAN MEMBERSHIP OF THE US ALONG WITH THE  
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FRG IN A FOLLOW-ON ORGANIZATION WHERE SOVIET COMPLAINTS WILL BE DISPUTED AND EALT WITH AND WHERE THE US CAN GIVE CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THE FRG. (THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO NEED TO GET INTO ORGANIZATIONAL DETAILS OF SUCH A FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM AT THIS TIME. THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE.)RESOR

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